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CHAPTER 16

Addressing
Gross Human Rights Abuses:
Punishment and
Victim Compensation
Diane F. Orentlicher
A. Introduction
International law has long recognized that human rights
guarantees rest, above all, on a foundation of law - in particular, on the assurance of an effective legal response when
violations occur. Notably, an act of law enforcement inaugurated the modern period of international protection of
human rights. Through the prosecution of Nazi leaders for
crimes against humanity at Nuremberg, the international
community simultaneously asserted that all states are bound
to respect fundamental rights, and that the vitality of these
rights depends upon the assurance of their enforcement
through legal process.
More recently, international law has continued to insist
upon legal accountability for at least the most serious violations of human rights. Recently drafted human rights instruments explicitly recognize states' duty to punish violations
of physical integrity, and authoritative interpretations of
human rights treaties have repeatedly emphasized the role
of punishment in securing fundamental rights. Human
rights treaties also affirm the importance of civil redress for
violations of protected rights, and in recent years interna-

tional responses to gross violations have placed increasing
emphasis on enforcement of states' duty to compensate victims.
The principle underlying these duties is straightforward:
the only way to assure that rights are protected is to maintain effective legal safeguards against their breach. In particular, those who commit atrocious human rights crimes must
be punished, and victims must be assured appropriate
redress.
But if international law has been emphatic in asserting
states' duty to punish atrocious crimes, states' compliance
with that duty has often been deficient, and international
efforts to promote better compliance have been patently
inadequate. States' compliance has been notably weak where
it is most needed: in situations of massive violations. Not
coincidentally, a general pattern of impunity has often been
the context in which systematic abuses occur. At times, governments have enacted amnesties conferring legal impunity
for grave violations of human rights; in other situations, de
facto impunity has been the rule. Although international
human rights bodies have recently begun to condemn
amnesties for gross violations, little serious effort has been
made to prevent states from using amnesties to consign atrocious crimes to legal oblivion. Too often, the international
community has effectively condoned impunity.
B. Overview of International Law Regarding

Legal Accountability for Human Rights
Violations
The legal consequences of gross violations of human rights
fall into two principal categories: criminal and civil liability.
As elaborated below, a growing number of international
instruments generally require states to punish those who
commit human rights crimes, such as extra-legal killings,
disappearances, and torture, and to assure that victims are
afforded appropriate redress. Customary law now prohibits
wholesale impunity for systematic patterns of these violations.

The civil and criminal consequences of gross violations of
human rights share some common rationales: both criminal
and civil liability deter abuses by putting potential delinquents on notice that human rights violations have legal consequences. Also, both forms of liability may help rehabilitate
victims. While this rationale is more obviously pertinent in
respect of civil redress, criminal punishment may also help
restore the dignity of human rights victims. It is now widely
recognized that public acknowledgement of responsibility
for human rights violations - a central function of criminal
prosecution -

promotes the rehabilitation of victims. 2 Fur-

ther, both criminal punishment and civil liability help establish and reinforce basic social norms.
Still, in other respects the two serve distinct goals, and at
any rate serve similar goals differently. Although justified on
several grounds, criminal punishment is based, above all, on
a deterrence rationale; international law requires states to
bring to justice those responsible for atrocious crimes
because criminal punishment is thought to be the most effective means of preventing the crimes' recurrence. Conversely,
failure to punish those who violate fundamental norms of
human dignity brings the law into contempt, and may serve
as a virtual license to repeat the crimes. In this respect,
states' duty to punish human rights crimes is owed as much
to society as to individual victims.'
While civil redress also serves a deterrent function, its
principal focus is the victim, and its paramount aim is reparation. Reparation can take a variety of forms beyond financial compensation, and remedies can often be tailored to
respond to victims' particular and immediate needs. For
example, persons arbitrarily deprived of their jobs because
of their political views can be reinstated. Psychiatric (as well
as physical) health care can be provided to torture survivors
at state expense.
The development of effective civil remedies may promote
another value as well: utilizing civil avenues of redress can
foster a sense of empowerment on the part of victims, and
this itself may promote the recovery process of trauma sur-

vivors.4 More generally, by enabling individuals to assert
and vindicate their rights, a system of effective civil remedies can help deepen a society's civic culture.
1. Criminal Accountability
a. CurrentLaw

Although few violations of human rights are international
crimes, international criminal law played a crucial role in the
development of human rights law. As previously noted, the
Allies' prosecution of crimes against humanity at Nuremberg (and then in Tokyo) was a watershed in the development of international human rights protections.
Yet despite its origins, human rights law has, until recently,
placed relatively little emphasis on criminal punishment.
Although the Nuremberg precedent was in effect codified in
the 1948 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 5 that treaty has never been invoked
by states parties as the basis of international criminal
enforcement. 6 On their face, the most comprehensive human
rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 7 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights8 (Covenant), are silent about states' duty to
punish those who commit serious abuses.
In recent years, however, the Covenant and its regional
counterparts have been authoritatively interpreted to require
that states parties bring to justice those who are responsible
for certain violations. For example the Human Rights Committee, which monitors compliance with the Covenant, has
repeatedly asserted that states parties must investigate torture, disappearances, and extra-legal executions and attempt
to bring the wrongdoers to justice.'
Although the European Court of Human Rights has had
few occasions to consider the role of punishment in securing
rights protected by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' 0 (European Convention), its decisions make clear that punishment
plays a necessary part in contracting states' fulfillment of
certain duties. In X and Y v. Netherlands," for example, the

Court found the Dutch government in breach of the European Convention by virtue of a gap in Dutch law that had
precluded a victim of sexual assault from instituting criminal
proceedings against her attacker, who escaped punishment.
Acknowledging that contracting states enjoy a "margin of
appreciation" in determining the means they will use to
secure the rights at issue,1 2 the Court found, nonetheless, that
only the criminal law provides an adequate means of protecting what it regarded as a crucial area of private life.13
Like the Covenant and European Convention, the American Convention on Human Rights 14 (American Convention)
nowhere explicitly mentions a duty to prosecute violations
of the rights it assures. Nevertheless, in recent years both the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights have interpreted the
Convention to require states parties to investigate serious
violations of physical integrity, such as torture, disappearances, and summary executions, and to bring the wrongdoers to justice. 15
In 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights handed down a landmark decision interpreting the American
Convention to require states parties to investigate certain
violations and to punish the perpetrators. The decision was
rendered in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,16 which was
brought before the Court by the Inter-American Commission
against the Honduran government for the unresolved disappearance of Manfredo Velasquez in September 1981.17
Although the fate of the victim could not be established conclusively, the Court heard testimony indicating that he had
been tortured and killed by Honduran security forces. The
Court found the Honduran government responsible for multiple violations of the American Convention, basing much of
its analysis on states parties' affirmative duty to "ensure"
rights elaborated in the Convention:
This obligation implies the duty of the States Parties to
organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the
structures through which public power is exercised, so that
they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full
enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of this obliga-

tion, the States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation
of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the
violation .... 18
The Court asserted that states parties' duties persist
despite a change in government. 19 While generally recognizing a duty to punish gross violations of physical integrity,
the bodies that monitor compliance with comprehensive
human rights treaties did not, until recently, squarely confront the question whether amnesty laws are compatible
with states parties' duties. The Human Rights Committee
finally did so, however, in April 1992, when it adopted a
"General Comment" asserting that amnesties covering acts
of torture "are generally incompatible with the duty of States
to investigate such acts; to guarantee freedom from such acts
within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that they do not occur
2
in the future." 1
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
reached a similar conclusion in two cases challenging the
validity of amnesty laws enacted in Argentina and Uruguay,
respectively. In decisions made public in October 1992, the
Commission found that the amnesty laws, which precluded
punishment of persons responsible for such crimes as disappearance, torture, and political killings, were incompatible
21
with the American Convention.
A duty to investigate and prosecute grave violations of
physical integrity has been explicitly recognized in more
recent human rights instruments. These include the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 22; the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture23; the Declaralion
on the Protection of All Persons From Enforced Disappearance24; and Principles on the Effective Prevention and Inves2
tigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions.
The frequent reiteration in international instruments of a
duty to punish grave violations of physical integrity is evidence that the duty has become, or is emerging as, a rule of
customary law. 26 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-

tions Law of the United States sheds light on the scope this
duty. The Restatement asserts that a state violates customary
law "if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or
condones" torture, murder, disappearances and several
other human rights violations,27 and suggests that "[a] government may be presumed to have encouraged or condoned
[these] acts ... if such acts, especially by its officials, have

been repeated or notorious and no steps have been taken to
prevent them or to punish the perpetrators." 28 Echoing the

logic of the Restatement, numerous reports prepared by Special Representatives, Special Rapporteurs, and Working
Groups appointed by the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights have condemned governments' consistent
failure to punish widespread acts of torture, disappearance,
and extra-legal executions and have suggested that the
resulting impunity encourages further violations. 29
In sum, in recent years international law has placed growing emphasis on states' duty to assure freedom from serious
violations of physical integrity through criminal sanctions.
But if the principle itself has been firmly established, international efforts to enforce the law have been patently inadequate. The aftermath of the Velasquez Rodriguez decision is
a case in point. Despite the Inter-American Court's decision,
no one has been punished for the disappearance of Manfredo Velasquez, and indeed the Court stopped short of ordering the Honduran government to institute prosecutions.
The Court did order the Honduran government to provide
information about steps taken to investigate the murders of
two individuals, one of whom had testified before the Court
in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, while the other was scheduled to do so. 30 Still, no one was prosecuted for these mur31
ders.

b. Adequacy of Law
There is thus a paradox in the development of international law prescribing the role of punishment in securing fundamental rights: on the one hand, legal norms requiring states
to punish those who commit atrocious crimes have been
clarified and strengthened in recent years. At the same time,

however, international bodies responsible for enunciating
the norms have been reticent to insist on enforcement.
What, then, accounts for this discrepancy? At one level, the
answer is simple. It is a lesser intrusion on sovereignty for an
international body to enunciate a norm than to insist on its
enforcement - particularly when the norm asserts duties in
an area traditionally left to the broad discretion of states.
At a deeper level, ambivalence about the desirability of
enforcing states' general duty to punish human rights crimes
has at times inhibited efforts to secure prosecutions. This
ambivalence is most apparent in the now-common circumstance in which a democratically elected government has
replaced one responsible for massive human rights violations. In these situations, issues of accountability frequently
pose a daunting dilemma. On the one hand, the balance of
power between the ancien regime and the new government is
often precarious, and prosecuting depredations of the outgoing regime may seem to place an already fragile democracy
at greater risk - particularly when the outgoing regime was
dominated by military sectors that retain a monopoly on the
use of force. On the other hand, impunity for atrocious
crimes of the recent past undermines the law's authority just
when a society is poised to reassert the supremacy of law. A
Faustian pact with a brutal regime - a pact to allow impunity in exchange for the end of dictatorship - raises the
specter of perpetuating the very lawlessness that is meant to
be ended.
This dilemma has proved agonizing for the many nations
that have confronted it in recent years - the cases of
Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, the Philippines, and Uruguay
are a few examples - and also seems to play a part in the
reticence of some international human rights bodies to press
for prosecutions during periods of transition from dictatorship to democracy. This ambivalence has, for example, been
evident in various pronouncements of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. In 1986, the Commission
expressed a general inclination to allow national authorities
to determine the validity of amnesty laws enacted by previ-

ous governments, subject to the qualification that the truth
about past violations must be fully known. 32 This view effectively established an exception to the Commission's general
rule that serious violations of physical integrity must be
punished - an exception for new democracies precariously
emerging in the aftermath of military dictatorship. By 1989,
however, the Commission's chairman voiced strong opposition to amnesty laws that bar prosecution of atrocious
crimes:
A compact by which a whole nation is called upon to suspend its memories of torture, murder, forcible "disappearances" of loved ones, a compact which would have citizens
pretend that the tragic losses and suffering which they have
undergone never occurred, this ...is no bargain. This is not

amnesty; it is forcible amnesia. The "peace" that is bought at
this price is supported by a thread slenderer even than the
thread by which the sword of Damocles was suspended. 33
The chairman suggested that such amnesties violate rights
set forth in the two key Inter-American human rights instruments: "The rights set out in the American Convention on
Human Rights and in the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man by their very nature cannot be
subject to extinction by national fiat." More recently, the
Commission seemed to complete its apparent progression by
adopting the previously noted reports finding that amnesty
laws enacted in Argentina and Uruguay are incompatible
with the American Convention. In fact, however, there are
some indications that the Commission's resolve regarding
the invalidity of amnesty laws has weakened in recent years.
Significantly, the Commission held up releasing its decisions
in the Argentina and Uruguay cases for a year after adopting
them. Throughout that period, there was intense speculation
that the Commission might backpedal, softening its strong
stance. 34
Another striking instance of this ambivalence can be found
in the report of the United Nations "Commission on the
Truth," established pursuant to a UN-brokered peace accord
between government and insurgent forces in El Salvador.
Released to the public on March 15, 1993, the report assigned

responsibility for numerous cases of political violence committed between 1980 and July 1991. Although the Commission's mandate enabled it to recommend cases for
prosecution,3 5 it declined to do so. The Commission
explained its decision this way:
The Commission feels justice demands punishment for the
violations of human rights. But it is not itself constituted to
specify sanctions and recognizes that the present Salvadoran
judicial system is incapable of fairly assessing and carrying
out punishment. Therefore the Commission feels it cannot
recommend judicial proceedings in El Salvador against the
persons named in its report until after judicial reforms are
carried out.'
The dilemma identified by the Commission is genuine. It is
almost tautological to note that a judiciary that has presided
over wholesale impunity for massive violations is in a state
of collapse. How to rebuild the law following the decimation
of judicial process presents challenges that few states have
successfully met. The dilemma is further compounded
when, as in El Salvador, those responsible for violations
retain the capacity to derail a fragile process of democratic
transition through the credible threat of violence.
But the problem with recognizing this dilemma as a justification for impunity is that it becomes the proverbial self-fulfilling prophecy. If the international community is to play an
effective role in breaking cycles of impunity, it must do what
it can to create a greater space for accountability.
An example of such a role can be found in the pressure
applied by the United States government for prosecution in
Chile of those responsible for ordering the 1976 assassination
in Washington, DC of Chilean opposition leader Orlando
Letelier and his U.S. colleague, Ronni Karpen Moffitt. Some
participants in the crime were prosecuted in U.S. courts in
the 1980s, but the alleged authors of the crime, military officials who held top positions in Chile's secret police agency,
eluded justice for fifteen years. Although resolution of this
case has long been a central issue in U.S.-Chile relations, as
recently as April 1991 a high-level official in Chile privately
admitted that it was unlikely the Aylwin government would

successfully prosecute the case. In his view, although the
government was committed to prosecuting the authors of
the Letelier-Moffitt assassination, it would be unable to do so
in light of the enduring power of the armed forces.
Five months later, the two principal suspects were indicted, and in November 1993 they were convicted and sentenced. What happened in the intervening period?
Significant pressure was brought to bear on the Chilean government by the United States government and by human
rights organizations. 37 Clearly, external pressure made a difference, providing a counterweight to the internal pressure
from a recalcitrant military. Significantly, too, the very act of
indicting the two suspects - an act that not long ago was
thought likely to provoke military unrest - instead helped
enhance the Aylwin government's power vis-A-vis the
Chilean armed forces. 38
The correlation of political forces in each country is
unique, of course, and international efforts to assure prosecution of military offenders must be sensitive to the peculiar
constraints that each government faces. In some countries,
there may be periods when there is virtually no possibility of
successfully prosecuting the military. Still, it is important to
recognize that, in many transitional societies, the correlation
of political power between a civilian government and the
military fluctuates, and may be susceptible to realignment as
new factors are introduced.
Importantly, international opposition to impunity for
human rights violations can operate as one of the factors that
determine the outcome of a contest between competing centers of power. Increasingly, respect for human rights has
become a crucial aspect of a government's legitimacy, both
domestically and internationally. In this setting, international
law can, in effect, take sides in a domestic contest between
military and civilian sectors, bringing its authority to bear on
behalf of civilian authority and the rule of law.
There are, of course, limits to the role that international
law and diplomacy can play in countering domestic pressures for impunity. Indeed, as suggested above, there may be

times when a government lacks the power to institute prosecutions for human rights violations. How, then, should international law and enforcement bodies address these
situations? Should international bodies, such as the UNappointed Commission on the Truth in El Salvador, frankly
acknowledge that the Salvadoran judiciary is incapable of
discharging the state's international obligations and decline
to press for prosecutions? Should they insist on the principle
of legal accountability - knowing that there will be situations in which the principle will not be vindicated?
In addressing these questions, two issues merit special
consideration: 1) the scope of states' obligation to punish
human rights violators in situations of massive crimes; and
2) the availability of doctrines of exception, such as the right
to derogate in times of emergency. For reasons elaborated
below, the following principles should guide both the further elaboration of relevant legal standards and future
enforcement efforts:
- States' general duty to punish gross violations of
human rights should be interpreted in a manner that
vindicates the rule of law without placing impossible or
unreasonable burdens on states. This approach can
largely obviate the need even to consider the relevance
of doctrines of exception, and can avoid false
dichotomies between destabilizing trials and wholesale
impunity.
- Appropriate international bodies should clearly
articulate the invalidity of laws that establish impunity
for atrocious crimes, and should insist upon accountability in their enforcement activities as well.
- In determining the availability of doctrines of
exception to excuse states from their general duty to
punish atrocious crimes, international bodies should
avoid adopting rules that might reward state actors,
such as military sectors, for thwarting justice. Instead,
established doctrines of exception should be interpreted
in a manner that encourages the civilian government to

attempt to bring violators to justice, while recognizing
legitimate limits to state power. In this area as others,
doctrines of exception should be narrowly interpreted.
c. Scope of General Obligation

If international law generally requires states to punish serious violations of physical integrity, must a newly-elected
government attempt to prosecute every such violation committed with impunity during a recent dictatorship? Applying the Restatement rule, customary law would be violated
by an amnesty that established complete impunity for systematic violations of the rights against torture, extra-legal
execution, and disappearance, but would not require prosecution of every person who committed one of these
offenses.39 Limited prosecutions, focusing in particular on
those who were most responsible for designing and implementing a system of atrocities or on especially notorious
cases that were emblematic of past violations, would seemingly satisfy states' duty under customary law, provided the
criteria used to select defendants did not appear to condone
or tolerate past abuses by, for example, cynically targeting a
handful of low-level scapegoats. Also, criteria used to limit
prosecutions should not generally excuse commission of
atrocious crimes on the ground that the perpetrators were
executing "superior orders," although this circumstance can
legitimately be considered as a defense if the perpetrator had
40
no "moral choice," or in mitigation of punishment.
More complex issues are raised by the question whether a
government of a state that has ratified the Covenant, the
European Convention, or the American Convention must
attempt to prosecute all serious violations of the right to
physical integrity committed by or with the acquiescence of
a previous regime. Decisions interpreting these conventions
include some indications that states parties are generally
expected to investigate every violation of the rights to life,
freedom from torture, and freedom from involuntary disappearance, and to prosecute those who are responsible.41 A
rigid application of the general rule that a state's international obligations persist despite a change in government 42

might, then, require successor governments to prosecute virtually every violation of these three rights that has not yet
been punished. 43
Yet in a country like Argentina, where some nine thousand
persons are estimated to have disappeared during the military juntas' "dirty war against subversion," such a requirement could place impossible demands on the judiciary. Even
a well-functioning judicial system would be incapable of discharging such a burden; 44 much less can this be expected following the wholesale collapse of the rule of law.
Further, open-ended prosecutions could exacerbate military opposition and strain an already fragile social fabric. 45 A
chief lesson of the Argentina experience is not, as some suggest, that prosecutions are destabilizing per se, but that prosecutions of indefinite duration and scope are likely to
destabilize. Although the Argentine military opposed prosecutions, it was prepared to allow prosecution of top military
commanders. But some factions rebelled when prosecutions
began to sweep more broadly, believing this tarnished the
military institutionally. Moreover public support for prosecutions, strong at the outset of the Alfonsin government,
waned as time elapsed and the trials' importance was
eclipsed by worsening economic conditions. In contrast,
human rights trials of finite scope and duration undertaken
in Greece in the mid-1970s provoked military discontent, but
were far less disruptive and helped consolidate the country's
transition to democracy.4
The contrasting experiences of Greece and Argentina suggest that the demands of legal accountability and political
stability may be best reconciled through prosecutions that
have defined limits. Exemplary trials can vindicate the
authority of the law and deter repetition of human rights
crimes, provided the trials comport with popular conceptions of justice.
Is selective prosecution compatible with states' duties
under the international conventions discussed earlier?
Although this issue has not been squarely addressed by any
of the relevant treaty bodies, exemplary prosecutions can be

undertaken in a manner that is consistent with the pertinent
decisional law of these bodies. This conclusion is based on
an interpretation of that law guided by the general canon of
construction that international treaties should be interpreted
in a manner that avoids imposing obligations that are impossible or whose discharge would prove harmful.47
Analyzing the general rule requiring prosecution of torture, extra-legal killings, and disappearances in light of its
rationale provides a principled basis for such an interpretation. The duty to punish serious violations of physical48
integrity is squarely grounded on a deterrence rationale.
Believing criminal sanctions to be the most effective means
of securing rights deemed of paramount importance, such
bodies as the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission have found investigation leading to punishment to be the most appropriate response to violations of
those rights. This rationale would not, however, compel
prosecution by a successor government of every violation
committed by a previous regime. While the deterrence
model supporting the general rule might require the new
government to investigate and seek to punish virtually every
violation committed thenceforth, it would simply be too late
to apply that model to prevent the violations that have
already occurred.
But a failure to punish any of the past violations would
frustrate the deterrence objective underlying the general
duty to punish. If the new government established complete
impunity for atrocious crimes committed on a sweeping
scale, its action would, as the Restatement reasoned, have the
effect of condoning the violations and thereby encouraging
similar ones. This result is plainly incompatible with the
affirmative convention-based duty to prevent violations. But
even a limited program of exemplary punishment could
achieve the deterrence objective that the conventions contemplate.
As this analysis suggests, international law requiring states
to punish grave violations of human rights can accommodate several key constraints faced by prosecutors in coun-

tries emerging from prolonged periods of military rule. The
duties imposed by international law are not so exacting that
they would place impossible demands on strained judicial
resources or require transitional states to undertake protracted and debilitating prosecutions. What the law disallows is
wholesale impunity for atrocious crimes committed on a
massive scale. Beyond this, however, the law leaves prosecutors a broad realm of discretion.
d. Derogation

If international law allows nascent democracies flexibility
to respond to internal pressures, there nonetheless may be
times when a fragile government lacks the power to comply
with even the modest obligations outlined above. When
instituting prosecutions would pose a genuine threat of a
coup - and not merely provoke military disaffection - can

a government be excused from its general duty to punish
atrocious crimes? The state of international law on this question is somewhat ambiguous, in large part because applicable principles do not take adequate account of situations in
which the military occupies an autonomous realm of power.
The three comprehensive conventions discussed in section
B.l.a. allow states parties to derogate from their duties in
time of public emergency that threatens the life of the nation
when various conditions are satisfied. 49 Under no circumstances, however, are derogations from the rights to life and
freedom from torture permitted. 0 When applicable, the customary doctrines of "state of necessity" and force majeure
similarly preclude the wrongfulness of a state's failure to
comply with its international obligations in exceptional circumstances.51 But the prohibitions of torture, disappearance,
and extra-legal executions are peremptory norms, 2 and thus
can never be abrogated pursuant to the "state of necessity"
orforce majeure doctrines.5 3

The question arises, then, whether states' duty to prosecute
these violations should also be treated as nonderogable on
the basis that prosecution is necessary to secure the peremptory rights. Authoritative interpretations of the conventions
analyzed in section B.l.a. offer no clear guidance on this

question; the issue has never been squarely addressed. And
a plausible case can be made in support of either possible
position.
Although similar considerations would apply to all three
conventions, the issue is framed most sharply under the
American Convention. Article 27(2) provides both that several substantive rights are nonderogable and that "the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights" are
likewise nonderogable.5 4 Interpreting this provision, the
Inter-American Court has concluded that states parties to the
American Convention cannot suspend individuals' right to
seek habeas corpus.5 Since the Court has found punishment
to be a necessary part of states parties' duty to ensure several
nonderogable rights,56 states parties arguably cannot derogate from their duty to prosecute violations of those rights.
While plausible, this interpretation of the American Convention is not inevitable. Habeas corpus and criminal prosecution could be distinguished for purposes of determining
whether derogation is permissible. Habeas corpus can avert
imminent harm or further harm; it can, for example, be used
to locate a person who has "disappeared" and thus save her
from physical danger, or to prevent a detainee who has been
tortured from suffering further abuse. 7 In contrast, criminal
prosecution cannot prevent the specific act for which punishment is sought; it can only deter future crimes. Thus, while
prosecutions play a necessary part in states parties' fulfillment of their duty to ensure fundamental rights, they may
not be deemed "essential" to the protection of those rights
for purposes of Article 27(2). Applying similar logic, the
duty to institute criminal proceedings pursuant to other conventions may be derogable, at least in principle. 8
Still, in view of the consistent recognition, reflected in
numerous decisions and pronouncements of intergovernmental bodies, that prosecution is necessary to secure enjoyment of several nonderogable rights, a rule of law allowing
states to derogate from the duty to prosecute violations of
those rights would produce untenable results. Such a rule
would place international law in the position of asserting on

the one hand that the rights to life, freedom from torture,
and freedom from involuntary disappearance are inviolable,
and on the other hand that, under certain circumstances,
states need not do that which is necessary to secure the
rights.
The customary doctrine of "state of necessity" produces
roughly the same effect as the derogations clauses of the
comprehensive human rights conventions. 9 The International Law Commission's draft articles on state responsibility
frame the doctrine this way: the "state of necessity" doctrine
precludes the "international wrongfulness of an act of a State
not in conformity with what is required of it by an international obligation" if "the State had no other means of safeguarding an essential State interest which was threatened by
a grave and imminent peril." 60 This justification is not available, however, "if the international obligation with which the
act of the State is not in conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general international law ... "61 As the earlier
discussion makes clear, the customary duty to prosecute torture, disappearances, and extra-legal executions "arises out
of" rights that are peremptory norms.
Even if the duty to prosecute certain human rights crimes
were derogable in principle, it would be extremely difficult
for states to justify suspension of prosecutions. Both the state
of necessity doctrine and the derogations provisions of
human rights treaties establish a high threshold for application, requiring a grave and imminent threat to an essential
state interest. 62 And when the applicable threshold is established, states parties to the conventions may derogate only
"to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,"63 while the state of necessity doctrine justifies noncompliance with international obligations only if "the State had
no other means" of safeguarding an essential interest that is
threatened by grave and imminent peril.64 Similarly, the force
majeure doctrine has an exceedingly high threshold of application.65 Under each of these standards, governments would
not be excused from their duty to prosecute human rights

violations simply to placate restive military forces; the excuses are available only to avert a threat to the life of a nation.
It is unclear, moreover, whether these excuses for noncompliance would apply even if military conduct did pose such
a threat. The ILC's draft articles on state responsibility assert
that a state of necessity may not be invoked to justify breach
of an international legal duty "if the occurrence of the situation of 'necessity' was caused by the State claiming to invoke
it as a ground for its conduct."6 6 Similarly, the ILC suggests
that the force majeure rule applies only if the event precluding
compliance with international responsibilities is "beyond the
control of the obligor and not self-induced." 67 Under the law
of state responsibility, conduct of a state organization including the military - is attributable to the state. 61 Thus if
a state failed because of military intimidation to punish human
rights crimes that it was otherwise required to prosecute, the
69
state would be in breach of its international obligations.
A decision of the European Commission of Human Rights
suggests a different approach under the derogations clause
of the European Convention. In the Greek Case, the Commission implicitly rejected the applicant states' argument that
the revolutionary military government of Greece could not
invoke the Convention's derogations provision because it
had, by overthrowing the previous government, brought
about the revolutionary situation upon which it based its
claim of entitlement to derogate. 70
One can fairly question whether the more widely recognized rules of attribution formulated by the ILC are appropriate in the peculiar context of societies in transition from
military government to civilian democracy. Legal rules
attributing conduct of armed forces to the state presuppose
the government's ability to assert control over its armed
forces.71But when countries emerge from a protracted period
of military rule, the armed forces often continue to occupy a
large realm of autonomous power, exerting more control
over the civilian government than it asserts over them. In
these circumstances, a rule of international law requiring
civilian authorities to discipline armed forces may seem

inappropriate, and even nonsensical - if not downright
dangerous.
Yet the alternative - excusing states from complying with
human rights duties - is also troubling. If transitional governments were excused from international duties when military obstruction impedes compliance, international law
would effectively reward the military's behavior.72
These issues merit further study and clarification. While
applicable rules are probably best clarified on a case-by-case
basis, future legal developments should be guided by one
overarching concern: legal rules governing derogation
should be fashioned to provide incentives for governments
to assert control over their armed forces. The law governing
state responsibility for injury caused by insurgent forces may
offer a productive analogy. International arbitral tribunals
have found or intimated that the wrongfulness of a state's
noncompliance with international duties toward aliens
might be precluded if the injury was caused by revolutionary forces over which the government could not assert control. 73 To avoid liability, a state must establish that it

exercised due diligence in seeking to prevent the situation
that made compliance with its international duties impossible. 74 This is a question of fact, to be determined on a caseby-case basis,

75

and the state's efforts to control

revolutionary forces by punishing their criminal acts are relevant to the analysis. 76
e. InternationalEnforcement Efforts

While some aspects of international law regarding the
duty to punish human rights crimes thus remain to be clarified, a more substantial challenge lies in the realm of implementation. As noted above, treaty bodies have been far more
effective in enunciating states' convention-based duty to
punish grave violations than in enforcing the obligation.
More assertive enforcement efforts might encounter resistance from some governments, but this should not deter
treaty bodies from making greater efforts to insist upon
states' compliance with their conventional duties. Following
the examples of the Inter-American Commission on Human

Rights in its decisions in the Uruguay and Argentina
amnesty-law cases 77 and of the European Court of Human
Rights in X and Y v. Netherlands,78 treaty bodies should, at the
very least, consistently award damages for states' failure to
institute prosecutions as required under relevant conventions.
International organizations should, moreover, take greater
care to ensure that their representatives and subsidiary
organs do not adopt positions that condone impunity. The
United Nations has an especially strong responsibility to
oppose impunity in countries where it has become deeply
involved, such as El Salvador, Haiti and Cambodia. As The
New York Times editorial board concluded when the Salvadoran government enacted an amnesty law following release of
the report of the UN-appointed Truth Commission, the
"unseemly rush to protect the guilty affronts the United
Nations-sponsored peace process, international human
rights law and the memory of El Salvador's victims."79
Similarly, the United Nations has undermined its own
accomplishment in establishing the principle that atrocious
crimes must be punished through its efforts to broker an
arrangement for the return to office of ousted Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In April 1993, the UN's special
envoy on Haiti promoted an accord that included an
amnesty for grave violations of human rights. Accepting this
proposal, President Aristide agreed to grant a political
amnesty to Haiti's military; pledged that his government
would not initiate criminal prosecutions against members of
the armed forces; and promised that he would not oppose
any legislation that might be enacted by Haiti's parliament
extending the amnesty to prevent private civil suits against
soldiers." Despite these concessions, the Haitian military
rejected the proposed settlement."1 But after economic sanctions went into effect against the military government in
Haiti, it agreed to a UN-sponsored accord that would result
in President Aristide's reinstatement. Like the earlier proposal, this accord, which was signed by both Aristide and the
military in July 1993 (and which the military subsequently

breached), included an amnesty provision. The accord
required the President to grant an amnesty to the extent of
his constitutional powers (essentially, for political crimes),
and to implement any broader amnesty that might be adopted by the Haitian parliament. 2 At best, such arrangements
leave the impression that the UN's own diplomats are
unaware of the important legal principles that the organization has established, and deeply compromise the law itself.83
To the extent that states' failure to bring wrongdoers to
account is due, in part, to weaknesses in their judiciaries, UN
technical assistance programs may be able to play a constructive role in strengthening the administration of justice.
Such programs should never be used, however, as a substitute for international enforcement action when the latter is
called for.
In situations where national courts are simply unable to
dispense justice, the international community should develop a meaningful role for international or regional tribunals,
starting with the ad hoc tribunal established by the UN for
crimes committed during the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, 84 to punish human rights crimes. Such bodies
may have more power and resources to assert the rule of law
than weak or corrupt national courts,85 and are more likely
than long-politicized national courts to be seen as impartial.
International bodies modeled on the Truth Commission in
El Salvador can help establish a significant measure of
accountability short of criminal punishment. Such commissions can develop a comprehensive and authoritative
account of gross violations committed during periods of
sweeping abuse. As in El Salvador and other countries that
have recently emerged from protracted periods of grotesque
violence, a "truth commission" could play a crucial role in
promoting national reconciliation and preventing a recurrence of violence. But while the efforts of such a commission
could provide an important complement to the work of a
criminal court -

whether national or international -

cannot serve as a substitute for criminal prosecution.

they

f. GreaterAttention to Violations of Women's Rights
One area in which both the development and enforcement
of legal standards have been notably weak is the protection
of women's human rights. The gender-specific dimension of
human rights violations has not yet received adequate treatment in the jurisprudence of treaty bodies, and violations of
women's human rights similarly have received inadequate
attention in the enforcement efforts of the United Nations
and regional organizations. In the past year, however, the
UN has finally taken several measures to address this deficiency. In 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 86 and
the Final Document of the World Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna gave unprecedented recognition to
women's human rights.
One initiative that could significantly advance the UN's
work in this area is a proposal, expected to be adopted in the
1994 session of the Commission on Human Rights, to
appoint a Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women.
While this rapporteur can play a vital role in advancing
women's human rights, his/her work should be a complement to, and not a substitute for, greater efforts to address
gender-specific violations by other rapporteurs, such as the
Rapporteur on Torture. In this regard and others, the necessary human and financial resources must be committed to
assuring greater integration of women's rights in the work of
UN human rights bodies, as mandated by the World Conference. In particular, the UN should commit greater resources
to assure that information and expert analyses relating to
violations of women's human rights are made available to
the various treaty bodies.
Issues relating to states' duty to assure effective legal protection should figure prominently in future developments of
the jurisprudence of women's human rights. Appropriate
UN bodies should clearly enunciate states' obligation to prevent and provide redress for gender-specific violations, such
as rape and sexual assault, committed by private, as well as
public, actors. At the level of implementation, the UN's advi-

sory services programs should place greater emphasis on
developing protections in national law against gender-specific violence.
The work of the recently established International Tribunal
for crimes committed during the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia will provide a critical opportunity to clarify and
strengthen legal protections of women's human rights.
Because the Tribunal is likely to consider cases involving
allegations of mass rape, it will be presented with an important opportunity to clarify rape's status as a war crime and
as a constituent element of genocide. Further, setting a
model for national governments, the Tribunal should utilize
procedures that address the special needs of rape survivors,
including procedures that protect these witnesses' privacy
needs, consistent with defendants' rights.88
2. Civil Redress
a. CurrentLaw

An assurance of legal redress for violations of protected
rights is commonplace in international human rights instruments. For example, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
constitution or by law." Pursuant to Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, each state
party undertakes
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity;
(b)To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall
have his right thereto determined by competent judicial,
administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State,
and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce
such remedies when granted.

This duty is based on states parties' general duty under
Article 2(1) to "ensure to all individuals within [their] territor[ies] and subject to [their] jurisdiction the rights recognized in the... Covenant," and "to adopt such legislative or
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
rights recognized in the... Covenant." The Covenant also
establishes "an enforceable right to compensation" for those
who have been "the victim of unlawful arrest or detention,"8 9 and provides that someone who has suffered punishment as a result of a wrongful conviction generally "shall be
compensated according to law." 90 The right to an effective
remedy for violations of human rights is also explicitly recognized in regional human rights treaties. 91
The scope and content of the right to redress is not entirely
clear, however. For example, states parties' general duty to
provide an effective remedy for violations of the Covenant
does not necessarily require that they assure compensation
for every type of violation. Indeed, the travaux preparatoires
make clear that the drafters sought to make Article 2 as
broad as possible, so that remedies could be tailored to
respond appropriately to specific violations. In some
instances, injunctive relief might be sufficient; in others, judi92
cially ordered compensation would be in order.
The Human Rights Committee has, however, consistently
recognized a right to compensation for torture, disappearances, and extra-legal executions. 93 Further, a UN expert,
Theo van Boven, interprets the jurisprudence of the Committee to signify its view that states parties' general duty "to
take effective measures to remedy violations" requires, in
respect of serious violations of physical integrity, that states
investigate the facts and bring the wrongdoers to justice.94 In
this view, states parties' duty to punish atrocious crimes constitutes part of their obligation to provide an effective remedy to the victims.
The Inter-American Court's judgment on compensation in
the Velasquez Rodriguez case presents a broad view of the
reparation owed to victims of serious violations under the
American Convention. The Court interpreted the right to

"[r]eparation of harm brought about by the violation of an
international obligation" to consist of "full restitution, which
includes the restoration of the prior situation, the reparation
of the consequences of the violation, and indemnification for
patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages, including emotional harm." 95 It also asserted that its earlier judgment on
the merits, finding the Honduran government responsible
for violations of the American Convention by virtue of the
disappearance of certain individuals, "is in itself a type of
reparation and moral satisfaction of significance and importance for the families of the victims."

96 But

the Court rejected

the petitioners' request for punitive damages, concluding
that the principle of punitive damages "is not applicable in
97
international law at this time."
A more recent judgment on reparations in the Aloeboetoe et
al. Case98 further elaborates the scope of states parties' duty
to provide compensation for violations of the American Convention. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
brought a contentious case against the government of Suriname based on a 1987 attack by government soldiers against
a group of "Bushnegroes." As a result of the attack, seven
men were killed after enduring physical and emotional
abuse. After initially contesting its responsibility, the government of Suriname admitted responsibility. In September
1993, the Inter-American Court issued a judgment ordering
the government to provide various forms of reparation to
the victims.
The Court recognized that, in addition to compensation for
the actual deaths of the victims, their successors were entitled to moral damages for the emotional suffering endured
by the victims before they were killed. 9 The Court reasoned:
The beatings received, the pain of knowing they were condemned to die for no reason whatsoever, the torture of having to dig their own graves are all part of the moral damages
suffered by the victims. In addition, the person who did not
have to die outright had to bear the pain of his wounds being
infested by maggots and of seeing the bodies of his companions be devoured by vultures. 100

In light of these facts, the Court held that "no evidence is
required to arrive at [the] conclusion" that the victims suffered moral damages; in support of this conclusion, "the
acknowledgement of responsibility by Suriname suffices." 10 1
The Court also awarded moral damages to victims' parents
who were not legal successors, reasoning that "it can be presumed that the parents have suffered morally as a result of
the cruel death of their offspring, for it is essentially human
102
for all persons to feel pain at the torment of their child."
Further, the Court awarded compensation to the next of kin
of two victims for expenses incurred in obtaining information about the victims, who were brothers; in searching for
their bodies; and in taking up the case with government
authorities.'
Notably, the Court's judgment gave effect to the customary
family law of the Saramaca tribe, to which the victims
belonged, in determining the survivors entitled to compensation. Since the customary law of the Saramacas allows
polygamy, and the government of Suriname recognizes the
tribe's family law, the Court awarded compensation to each
wife of the married victims. 104 Still, the Court rejected the

Commission's claim that, since Saramacas have special ties
not only to their immediate relatives but also to the tribal
community, the community itself suffered harm by virtue of
the victims' murders and is therefore entitled to compensation.1 05
Also noteworthy was the Court's order that the Suriname
government provide for the education of the minor children
of the victims until they reach a certain age. Because most of
the children live in the village of Gujaba, where the school
had been shut down, the Court concluded that:
[A]s part of the compensation due, Suriname is under the
obligation to reopen the school at Gujaba and staff it with
teaching and administrative personnel to enable it to function on a permanent basis as of 1994. In addition, the necessary steps shall be taken for the medical dispensary already
in place
there to be made operational and reopen that same
106
year.

Significantly, too, the Court ordered the government to
deposit a specified sum of compensation in two trust funds
for the beneficiaries, and even ordered the creation of a
Foundation to serve as trustee. 10 7 Finally, the Court determined that it would supervise compliance with its order on
reparations before closing its file on the case. 108
Outside the treaty context, various efforts have been made
in recent years to identify and strengthen victims' right to an
effective remedy for violations. For example, in 1985 the UN
General Assembly adopted a Declaration of Basic Principles
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, 109 which
elaborated general standards relating to compensation of
victims of crime and of abuse of government power. Victims
of the latter are defined as "persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm ...through acts or omissions

that do not yet constitute violations of national criminal laws
but of internationally recognized norms relating to human
rights.""10 The Declaration asserts that both types of victims
should, where appropriate, receive restitution and/or compensation, including material, medical, psychological, and
social assistance and support."'
In 1989 the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Sub-Commission) of the
UN Commission on Human Rights appointed one of its
members, Theo van Boven, to study the right to restitution,
compensation, and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 2 His final
report, completed in July 1993, presents a comprehensive
review of international law and practice in respect of reparation for victims of gross violations of human rights, and also
describes several examples of national practice. The report
recommends that the United Nations adopt a set of principles and guidelines "that give content to the right to reparation for victims of gross violations of human rights," 113 and
sets forth proposed principles and guidelines.
The first proposed principle recognizes that, "[u]nder
international law, the violation of any human right gives rise
to a right of reparation for the victim."" 4 It goes on to urge

that "[p] articular attention must be paid to gross violations
of human rights and fundamental freedoms," which were
the subject of the Special Rapporteur's inquiry. These violations include:
at least ... genocide; slavery and slavery-like practices; summary or arbitrary executions; torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment; enforced disappearance;
arbitrary and prolonged detention; deportation or forcible
transfer of population; and systematic discrimination, in particular based on race or gender.
While the first principle recognizes victims' right to reparation under international law, the second principle recognizes states' corresponding "duty to make reparation in case
of a breach of the obligation under international law to
respect and to ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." ' 5
Another noteworthy principle asserts that the purpose of
reparation for human rights violations is to "reliev[e] the
suffering of and afford justice to victims by removing or
redressing ... the consequences of the wrongful acts and by

preventing and deterring violations." 1 6 Other principles
elaborate the theme that reparation should include both conventional measures designed to repair harm to victims and
measures of criminal justice:
4. Reparation should respond to the needs and wishes of
the victims. It shall be proportionate to the gravity of the violations and the resulting harm and shall include: restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of
non-repetition.
5. Reparation for certain gross violations of human rights
that amount to crimes under international law includes a
duty to prosecute and punish
perpetrators. Impunity is in
11 7
conflict with this principle.

Also significant are the Report's recognition that the right
to reparation in international law includes a right to compensation for mental as well as physical harm,"1 8 and its recommendation that states should "make adequate provision
for groups of victims to bring collective claims and to obtain
collective reparation" where appropriate.11 9

b. Adequacy of Law
While the right to civil remedies has, until recently,
received less attention internationally than states' duty to
prosecute violators, in some respects international human
rights machinery appears to be more effective - though
scarcely adequate - in addressing the former. For example,
both the European and Inter-American Courts of Human
Rights have at times ordered governments to pay compensation to victims of violations, and not merely declared that
states parties have a duty to afford redress.
Indeed, the only remedial power explicitly given the Court
under the European Convention is to "afford just satisfaction
to the injured party"; the Court can exercise this power if it
finds that a contracting party has violated the Convention
and its domestic law "allows only partial reparation to be
made for the consequences" of the breach. 120 Using this
power, the Court has awarded financial compensation in
well over one hundred cases. 121 In the previously-noted case
of X and Y v. Netherlands, the Court, finding the Dutch government partly responsible for the harm suffered by the
applicant in consequence of the sexual assault upon her,
ordered the government to pay compensation. 122 In contrast,
the Court has held that it cannot direct a respondent state to
institute criminal proceedings. 1 3
The Inter-American Court enjoys relatively broad remedial
powers pursuant to the American Convention.1 24 But while
the Court apparently has the power to order states parties to
institute criminal proceedings, it has, like the European
Court, been more forthcoming in ordering financial compensation. The Court ordered compensatory damages in the
Velasquez Rodriguez case, but stopped short of ordering the
Honduran government to institute criminal proceedings despite its earlier judgment on the merits, reaffirmed in the
judgment on damages, finding that the Honduran government has a continuing duty to investigate the disappearance
of Manfredo Velasquez Rodriguez and bring the wrongdoers
to justice.125 While no prosecutions have been instituted pursuant to the Court's judgment, the survivors of Manfredo

Velasquez Rodriguez have received a substantial portion of
the damages awarded by the Court.
The action of the Commission on the Truth in El Salvador
reflects a similar dichotomy in respect of punishment and
compensation. While declining to recommend criminal prosecution, the Commission presented innovative recommendations for measures of compensation. Specifically, the
Commission asserted that it "believes that justice ...
demands that the victims of human rights violations by all
sides in the war be publicly recognized and be given material compensation." Its report calls for a special fund to be
established for this purpose, which would be given
resources by the government, and urges foreign governments to allocate one percent of their aid to El Salvador to
6

12
that fund.

Still another example of international bodies demonstrating greater resolve to secure civil compensation than to
assure punishment is the United Nations' effort to establish
legal redress for violations of international law committed
by Iraq in connection with its occupation of Kuwait. On
August 2, 1991, the Security Council established a Compensation Commission that would create a fund to pay compensation for claims against Iraq "for any direct loss, damage,
including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or any injury to foreign Governments' nationals
and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and
occupation of Kuwait." 127 The types of violations for which
awards have been granted by the Commission "track the
fundamental rights, and violations thereof, elaborated in the
various human rights instruments

."1'

In contrast to its

action in establishing a process for civil claims against Iraq,
the United Nations never established a tribunal to punish
war crimes committed during the Persian Gulf conflict,
although the possibility of such prosecutions was widely
debated in the aftermath of the war.
The work of the recently established International Tribunal
for war crimes committed during the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia will present an opportunity for further develop-

ment of international measures of reparation. Although the
Tribunal's jurisdiction is criminal, its statute authorizes the
trial chamber of the Tribunal to "order the return of any
property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct ...
to

their rightful owners" following a defendant's conviction.1'29
On the national level, civil forms of redress have been
available to varying degrees. Germany's reparations to victims of Nazi atrocities remain the most extensive effort to
compensate victims of human rights crimes. In more recent
years, a few countries have acted responsibly and compassionately in developing measures of compensation for victims of human rights violations. In Chile, for example, the
government of Patricio Aylwin undertook a number of creative measures to assure redress for those who had suffered
serious human rights violations during the preceding period
of government under the rule of General Augusto Pinochet.
The Aylwin government established a National Commission
for Truth and Reconciliation, whose principal task was to
investigate "serious violations of human rights perpetrated
in Chile between 11 September 1973 and 11 March 1990."
The decree establishing the Commission also directed it to
recommend measures to redress the damage suffered by victims of these violations, as well as to suggest legal reforms
and other measures to prevent future violations.
These two mandates were intimately connected, as the
Commission repeatedly asserted. The Chief of Staff of the
Commission explains:
[I]n situations of past human rights violations, an obligation arises for the state and for all of society to involve itself
in [the] reparative process.
It became clear early to the members of the Commission
that a full disclosure of the truth had enormous links with
the beginning of a reparative process and in the way we
came to understand it. The report frequently insists that a
meaningful reparative process must express a recognition of
the truth, both by the state and society. "The reparative
process presupposes the courage to face the truth and to
"130
bring about justice ...

The Commission's insights sound a theme that has swept
Latin America, and has been taken up by human rights
advocates throughout the world: Establishing the truth
about massive violations of the recent past is an essential
obligation of governments, and a critically important measure of reparation for the victims.
The need for truth is especially important with respect to
the fate of those who disappeared; so long as the fate of the
principal victim remains unclarified, his or her loved ones
continue to endure suffering that has itself been recognized
as a form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.' Thus, the Chilean Commission attempted not only
to establish a comprehensive and authoritative "truth" about
the violations committed during the years covered by its
mandate, but also sought to identify the "individual truth"
about the fate of those who had disappeared.
While seeing "the disclosure of the truth and the end of
secrecy as reparation" in itself,132 the Commission also
emphasized the importance of official action signaling the
government's "recognition of the dignity of the victims and
the pain of their relatives" as a key component of reparation."133 With this in mind, the Commission recommended
various measures that the government should undertake to
restore the dignity of victims, such as creating national monuments.1 34
The Commission also recommended a series of more tangible forms of compensation, demonstrating exemplary creativity and compassion in this aspect of its work as well. For
example, the Commission recommended that the government exempt from mandatory conscription the sons of the
victims of human rights violations chronicled in its report, to
spare them further suffering. As for financial compensation,
the Commission recommended that this include various
social benefits, such as health care (including psychological
care), and financial support for the education of children of
persons killed or disappeared.
While some countries have adopted appropriate measures
to rehabilitate victims of human rights violations, the

response of governments to gross violations has often been
wholly inadequate. In some countries, little if any financial
compensation has been made available to victims. Depleted
national resources often render significant financial compensation for massive violations a formidable challenge. Further,
impunity for violations of the recent past, a widespread pattern in Latin America, has often impeded victims' ability to
obtain civil redress. In many countries, amnesties extinguishing the possibility of criminal liability have effectively
destroyed the possibility of civil compensation as well, as
they render virtually impossible a potential claimant's ability
to establish facts critical to his or her claim.13 5 The operation
of statutory and other limitations in national law have frequently deprived victims of gross violations of any remedy.
The advisory services program of the United Nations
might be able to make a useful contribution in addressing at
least some of these issues. In countries whose legal systems
have not yet developed adequate forms of legal redress, the
UN could work with the government to develop strengthened procedures that are appropriate to the national situation and legal framework, while responsive to victims'
needs.
Further, in the area of women's rights there is a special
need to develop stronger international machinery, as well as
to articulate standards of redress appropriate to national systems. As to the former, the United Nations should adopt an
optional protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women136 establishing
an individual petition procedure. With respect to the latter,
special attention should be given to measures of redress to
protect women from domestic violence.
Finally, the UN should take effective steps to ensure that
the Japanese government provides long-overdue compensation to the so-called "comfort women" who were forced into
sexual slavery during World War II. Although the Japanese
government finally acknowledged in August 1993 that the
Imperial Army had forced thousands of women (principally

Korean) into sexual slavery during the war,13 7 it has not yet
agreed to provide compensation.

C. Summary of Recommendations
The following recommendations, designed to strengthen
both substantive international law prescribing legal consequences for gross violations of human rights and efforts to
secure compliance with the law, are based upon the preceding analysis:
1. Every effort should be made to secure ratification of
human rights instruments establishing a duty to assure
that individuals who commit gross violations are brought
to justice, and that the victims receive adequate and
appropriate redress.
2. Appropriate international bodies should continue to insist
upon the principle of accountability, and should make
greater efforts to secure compliance with that principle.
Following the example of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights in cases challenging amnesty laws
adopted in Uruguay and Argentina, and of the European
Court in X and Y v. Netherlands, international bodies
should award damages for states' failure to prosecute
human rights crimes as a distinct breach of states' conventional obligation to ensure freedom from grave violations
of physical integrity, as well as for the violation that gave
rise to the duty to prosecute.
3. The invalidity of amnesty laws that establish impunity for
atrocious crimes should be clearly articulated in future
standard-setting instruments.
4. In no circumstances should international bodies adopt
positions that seem to condone impunity. The United
Nations has an especially strong responsibility to oppose
impunity in countries where the UN has become deeply
involved, such as Cambodia, El Salvador, and Haiti.
5. In determining the availability of doctrines of exception to
excuse states from their general duty to bring to justice

those who are responsible for atrocious crimes, international bodies should avoid adopting rules that might
reward state actors, such as military sectors, for thwarting
justice. Instead, established doctrines of exception should
be interpreted in a manner that encourages the civilian
government to attempt to bring these sectors under the
rule of law. In this area as others, doctrines of exception
should be narrowly interpreted.
6. Appropriate UN bodies should clearly enunciate states'
obligation to prevent, and provide redress for, violations
of women's human rights, such as rape and sexual
assault, committed by private, as well as public, actors.
The UN Commission on Human Rights should appoint a
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. UN
advisory services programs should focus on protections in
national law against gender-specific violence.
7. The recent establishment of an International Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia provides a critical opportunity to
clarify and strengthen legal protections of women's
human rights under international law. The Tribunal
should explicitly recognize that rape is a war crime, as
well as a potential constituent element of crimes against
humanity and genocide. Further, setting a model for
national governments, the Tribunal should utilize procedures that show due regard for rape survivors' need for
privacy, consistent with respect for defendants' due
process rights.
8. In situations where national courts are unable or unwilling
to assure accountability for gross violations of human
rights, the international community should take responsibility for doing so. Where appropriate, the international
community should establish international tribunals, starting with the International Tribunal for violations committed in the former Yugoslavia, to bring to justice those who
are responsible for atrocious crimes. Such bodies may
have more power and resources to assert the rule of law

than weakened or corrupt national courts, and they are
more likely to be seen as impartial.
9. Building on its precedent in El Salvador, the United
Nations should continue to take effective measures to
assure that, in situations of massive human rights violations, an authoritative and comprehensive account of the
violations is prepared and made public. In situations
where the government itself fails to establish and
acknowledge the truth, the international community
should discharge that responsibility. The duty to establish
and acknowledge the truth about gross violations is owed
to individual victims as well as society, and is a crucial
foundation for both national reconciliation and the rehabilitation of victims. But while international bodies modeled on the El Salvador Truth Commission can play an
important role in establishing accountability, they should
not be seen as a substitute for criminal prosecution.
10. To the extent that states' failure to bring wrongdoers to
account is due, in part, to the weakness of national
courts, UN technical assistance programs may play a
constructive role in strengthening the administration of
justice. Such programs should never be used, however,
as a substitute for international enforcement action when
the latter is called for.
11. International organizations should consider creative
means of establishing funds for victims of systematic
violations of human rights in situations where the
responsible national government is unable to meet its
responsibilities in this regard. Such funds would be particularly useful and appropriate in situations where a
new democracy replaces a government responsible for
massive violations of basic rights, but lacks the resources
to rehabilitate victims. Building on the approach recommended by the El Salvador Truth Commission, national
governments should consider earmarking part of their
bilateral aid to such countries for a compensation fund
for victims.

NOTES
Portions of this chapter build upon two previous publications, Diane
F. Orentlicher, "Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime,"100 Yale LJ.2537 (1991) [hereinafter "Settling Accounts"]; and D. Orentlicher, "The Role of the
Prosecutor in the Transition in Latin America," in Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Judiciary249 (I. Stotzky ed., 1993).
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See, e.g., Seminar on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (1992) [hereinafter
SIM Report] at 19.
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The Human Rights Committee, which monitors compliance with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
GA Res. 2200, 21 UN GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, UN Doc. A/6316
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